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Introduction
Imagine going to work every day knowing that you must
endure your coworkers' degrading and derogatory comments.
Your work environment is so full of hostility and anger toward you
that you not only dread, but also fear, facing your coworkers
everyday. You feel hopeless because you are unable to end the
animosity provoked solely by characteristics and stereotypes you
cannot control. You must work to support yourself, but you cannot
live up to expectations under these conditions.
Imagine mustering the courage to protect yourself by filing a
complaint of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and having to relive all of the indecent
and painful experiences to sustain your complaint. Imagine that,
in response to the complaint, you are further ostracized and
chastised by your coworkers. Imagine the hopelessness of having
no source of support or guidance, and no legal protection from your
coworkers' desire to punish your recourse to anti-discrimination
laws.
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 to
protect employees from workplace discrimination by affording
them "the right to work in an environment free from
The two
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." 2
primary purposes of Title VII are to ensure equal opportunities in
employment by preventing discrimination, and to make persons
* J.D. expected 2001, University of Minnesota; B.S. and B.A. 1996, University of
North Dakota. The author wishes to thank her family for their constant support
and encouragement throughout the renditions of this article and her entire law
school experience. She is also very grateful to the editors and staff at Law &
Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice, especially Todd Hentges and Kate
Stendahl, who provided insight and guidance without which this article would not
have materialized.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 2653 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1999)).
2. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
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whole for injuries suffered due to unlawful employment
discrimination. 3 To achieve these aims, Congress made specific
under Title VII's antitypes of employment practices unlawful
4
discrimination provision, section 703(a).
In addition to providing protection against specific
discriminatory employment practices, section 704(a) of Title VII
prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who have
filed discrimination charges with the EEOC. 5 The federal circuit
courts uniformly recognize that a hostile work environment claim
They
is actionable under the anti-discrimination provision. 6
disagree, however, as to whether a hostile work environment claim
is also prohibited by the anti-retaliation provision.
This Article addresses whether retaliatory harassment by
coworkers may constitute an adverse employment action under
section 704(a) of Title VII. Part I provides background information
regarding the interpretations of the adverse employment action
requirement. It discusses the relationship between sections 703(a)
and 704(a). It also explains how the courts construe the adverse
employment action requirement under section 703(a). Finally, it
describes the differing interpretations of the adverse employment
Part II addresses
action requirement under section 704(a).
whether broadening the scope of section 704(a) to proscribe
retaliatory coworker harassment comports with the text, purpose,
and judicial interpretation and of the statute. Part III concludes
that courts should uniformly recognize that coworker retaliatory
harassment violates section 704(a) if (1) the abusive conduct was
sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
employment; and (2) the employer knew of the discrimination; but
(3) failed to take reasonable remedial steps.

3. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 2653 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1999)).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(a)(1) to (a)(2) (1999).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1999).
6. See infra notes 33-53 and accompanying text; see also Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 785-86 (1998) (noting that the federal courts of appeals
have followed the substantive contours of section 703(a)).

103

2001] PROTECTING EMPLOYEES FROM EMPLOYEES
I.

Interpretation of the Anti-Retaliation Provision
A. The Relationship Between the Anti-Discriminationand
Anti-Retaliation Provisionsof Title VII and the Prima
Facie Case

The substantive anti-discrimination provision of Title VII7
contains two sub-provisions, sections 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2).
Section 703(a)(1) makes it unlawful for an employer to
"discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."8 Section 703(a)(2) states that it is unlawful for an
employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees ...

in any

way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."9 Title VII also contains an anti-retaliation
provision, section 704(a), which makes it illegal for an employer
"to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants...
because [the employee or applicant] has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because
he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title
VII]

"10

Although the three provisions use markedly different
language, 1 courts have applied the discrimination concepts
developed under each provision to the others. 12 For example,
courts apply the burden-shifting approach, first developed under
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green1 3 for disparate treatment
7. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (2000).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1999).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1999).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1999).
11. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1999) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)
(1999), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1999).
12. See discussion infra Part I.C.1-2 (describing judicial interpretation of the
anti-retaliation provision); see also Rebecca Hanner White, De Minirnis
Discrimination,47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1148 (1998) ("Title VII is a statute containing
broadly worded prohibitions that necessarily have required extensive
interpretations by the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.").
13. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas model for disparate
treatment discrimination cases, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 802. If a prima facie
case is established, a presumption of discrimination arises in favor of the plaintiff.
See id. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to produce a
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discrimination cases under section 703(a), to retaliation
discrimination cases under section 704(a). 14
Following the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, cases of retaliation require the
plaintiff first to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by a
preponderance of the evidence. 15 The prima facie case requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that (1) he or she engaged in statutorily
protected activity under Title VII;16 (2) he or she suffered an
adverse employment action; 17 and (3) there is a causal link
between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action.' 8 If the plaintiff can establish these three elements, a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. See id. at 802-03. If
the defendant rebuts the presumption of discrimination, the plaintiff may still
prevail if he or she demonstrates the reason articulated by the defendant was a
mere pretext for discrimination. See id. at 804. The overall burden of persuasion
always remains on the plaintiff to prove that he or she was a victim of intentional
discrimination. See id. at 805; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 120
S. Ct. 2097, 2105-12 (2000). The Reeves court applied the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm to a claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
See id. It held that a plaintiffs prima facie case of age bias, together with evidence
that the employees asserted reason for taking the allegedly discriminatory action
was false, can sustain a jury's finding for the plaintiff even without direct proof of a
discriminatory motive. See id.
14. See Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 443 (2d Cir.
1999) ("We evaluate retaliation claims under the burden shifting rules established
by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green."); see also Melissa A. Essary
& Terence D. Freidman, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the
ADA. Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63 MO. L.
REV. 115, 120 (1998) (discussing the application of the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting paradigm in retaliation cases).
15. See Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1263 (10th Cir.
1998); Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 1997);
Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997); Smart v. Ball
State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1996); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1333
(7th Cir. 1996).
16. The plaintiffs protected activity must be motivated by a reasonable, goodfaith belief that unlawful discriminatory conduct occurred, and that the action is
attributable to the employer. See Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1549 (11th Cir.
1989); see also Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 702 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that it is
not necessary that the employer is actually committing an unlawful employment
practice under Title VII; rather, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to reasonably believe
that the employer is violating the statute); Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669
F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that even an incorrect belief that an
employer action constituted a violation of Title VII, if reasonable, is enough to
satisfy the first prong of the prima facie case of retaliation); Payne v. McLemore's
Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1137 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that a
plaintiff can satisfy the first prong of the prima facie case by showing a reasonable
belief that an unlawful employment practice was occurring).
17. See Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1262.
18. See supra note 15. To establish a causal connection between the plaintiffs
protected activity and the adverse employment action, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the employer would not have taken the adverse action but for the
protected activity. See Grizzle v. Travelers Health Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 26768 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a retaliation claim fails where a plaintiff is unable
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presumption of retaliation arises in favor of the plaintiff. 19 The
burden of production then shifts to the defendant to produce a
20
If
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.
the defendant-employer meets its burden, the presumption of
retaliation is rebutted. 21 A plaintiff may still prevail, however, if
he or she is able to establish that the reason articulated by the
defendant was a mere pretext for retaliation. 22 The plaintiff
retains the overall burden of persuasion to show that there was
23

retaliation throughout the case.
Each prong of the prima facie case has generated a
significant body of law defining what will suffice in stating a
claim. 24 The second prong of the test, however, requiring that the
complainant suffer an adverse employment action, is the most
controversial. 25 Although the federal courts agree that a plaintiff

must demonstrate the second element of the prima facie case of
retaliation, 26 there is lack of consensus among courts as to what
27
conduct may constitute an adverse employment action.
Courts also look to the anti-discrimination provision for

guidance in interpreting the substantive requirements of the antiretaliation provision, including the determination of what actions
constitute an adverse employment action. 28
Although the
provisions are not identical in the prohibited activities, both
section 703(a)(1) and section 704(a) make it an unlawful

employment action for an employer "to discriminate." 29 Moreover,
to produce evidence that her employer knew about her complaint); see also
Manharon v. Columbia Univ. Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590, 593-94
(2nd Cir. 1988) (requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of
the protected activity and that such knowledge motivated the employer to
retaliate).
19. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973); see also
Richardson, 180 F.3d at 443; Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1263; Munday, 126 F.3d at 242;
Manning, 127 F.3d at 692; Smart, 89 F.3d at 439; Knox, 93 F.3d at 1333; Essary &
Freidman, supra note 14, at 120 (discussing the application of the McDonnell
Douglasburden-shifting paradigm in retaliation cases).
20. See supra note 19.
21. See supra note 19.
22. See supra note 19.
23. See supra note 19.
24. See Marisa Williams & Rhonda Rhodes, Recent Developments in Retaliation
Law and Resulting Implicationsfor the Federal Sector, COLO. LAW., Jan. 28, 1999,
at 59, 60.
25. See id.
26. See supra note 15.
27. See discussion infra Part I.C (describing judicial interpretations of the antiretaliation provisions).
28. See discussion infra Part I.C (describing judicial interpretations of the antiretaliation provisions).
29. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1999), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 19:101

like the prima facie case of retaliation, the prima facie case of
discrimination requires the plaintiff to show that he or she
suffered an adverse employment action.3 0 Therefore, despite
failure of section 704(a) to specifically mention "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 31 courts equate
discrimination actionable under section 704(a) with discrimination
32
actionable under section 703(a)(1).
B. Adverse Employment Actions Under Section 703(a)(1)
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color,
sex, or national origin."3 3
Consistent with the liberal
interpretation of Title VII, the Supreme Court has broadly
construed the provision to include any aspect of the employment
relationship. 34 In addition, it has recognized that an adverse
employment action may occur through either explicit or
constructive alterations in the terms and conditions of
35
employment.
1. Explicit Alterations in the Terms and Conditions of
Employment Through Tangible Employment Actions
A tangible employment action is a materially adverse change
in employment status, such as a termination of employment, a
(1999). Title VII, however, does not define the term "discriminate." See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
30. The prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination under section
703(a)(1) requires a showing that (1) the plaintiff was a member of a class protected
under Title VII; (2) the plaintiff applied for or performed an available position; (3)
the plaintiff was qualified for the position; (4) the plaintiff suffered an adverse
employment action; and (5) the employer gave preference to someone outside the
protected class. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
31. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1999), with 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-3(a)
(1999). Section 703(a)(1) proscribes discrimination with respect to "compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment." Section 704(a) simply proscribes
discrimination.
32. See discussion infra Part I.C (examining the more liberal construction of the
adverse employment action adopted by some circuits).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(a)(1) (1999).
34. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75-77 (1984) (construing the
provision to guarantee
equal employment opportunity by eradicating
discrimination in all aspects of the employment relationship); see also White, supra
note 12, at 1151 (recognizing that courts now understand that harm need not be
economic in nature to be considered materially significant).
35. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998).
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demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a failure to
promote, a material loss of benefits, or significantly diminished
material responsibilities. 36
In most cases, the tangible
employment action will inflict direct economic harm. 37 Only a
supervisor is empowered to make economic decisions affecting
other employees under his or her control; therefore, only a
supervisor can cause this type of injury. 38 Thus, a tangible
employment action cannot result from coworker actions. Since the
supervisor is acting as an agent for the employer, the employer is
vicariously liable when supervisory discrimination results in a
39
tangible employment action.
2. Constructive Alterations in the Terms and Conditions of
Employment Through a Hostile Work Environment
Section 703(a) also forbids constructive alterations in the
terms and conditions of employment due to a hostile work
environment. 40 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,4 1 the Supreme
Court expressly rejected an interpretation of Title VII that limited
its protection to tangible economic matters and explained that the
phrase "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" in section
703(a)(1) is an expansive concept which includes protection
42
against a hostile work environment based on discrimination.
Title VII, however, does not regulate all adverse conduct in
the workplace. 43 For a hostile work environment to exist as
36. See id. at 761. Tangible employment action claims are also identified as
"quid pro quo" claims. See id. Not all adverse actions, however, are severe or
pervasive enough to be tangible employment actions. See, e.g., Kocsis v. Multi-Care
Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 887 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that a demotion without a
change in pay, benefits, duties or prestige was also insufficient to support a claim);
Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 456 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a
bruised ego was insufficient to create liability); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that reassignment to a more
inconvenient job did not create liability).
37. See BurlingtonIndus., 524 U.S. at 762.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 754-65 (discussing the applicability of agency law to impose
liability upon the employer). The employer is liable independent of whether the
employer knew, should have known, or approved of the supervisory action. See id.
at 761 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986)).
40. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) ('We have
repeatedly made clear that although the statute mentions specific employment
decisions with immediate consequences, the scope of the prohibition is not limited
to the 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination and that it covers more than 'terms'
and 'conditions' in the narrow contractual sense.") (citations omitted); Harris v.
Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-66.
41. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
42. See id. at 64-66.
43. See id. at 67 ("Not all workplace conduct that may be described as
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proscribed by Title VII, the workplace must be "permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment." 44 This
standard is a compromise between making actionable any conduct
that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a
tangible physical injury. 45 It requires that the discriminatory
conduct be so severe or pervasive that it creates an objectively and
subjectively hostile work environment. 46 Moreover, the abusive
conduct must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to
be deemed pervasive. 47 However, the standard does not require
the conduct to be so abusive as to seriously affect an employee's
emotional or psychological health.48 Nor does it require that the
employee suffer tangible adverse effects such as an inability to
49
perform the job or obstruction of career advancement.
In determining whether the work environment is sufficiently
hostile or abusive, courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances,50 including (1) the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct
was physically threatening or humiliating or merely offensive; (4)
whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with the employee's
51
work; and (5) what psychological harm, if any, resulted.
Under the hostile work environment doctrine, the imposition
of liability on the employer depends on who is harassing the
victim. In cases where a supervisor creates a hostile work
environment, the employer is vicariously liable.5 2 In such cases,
however, the employer may offer an affirmative defense to liability
and damages by showing that (1) it exercised reasonable care to

'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment within the
meaning of Title VII.").
44. Harris,510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-67).
45. See id.
46. See Faragher,524 U.S. at 788; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-23 (holding that a
Title VII hostile environment claim will succeed only where the discriminatory
conduct is so severe or pervasive as to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment and where the victim subjectively perceives the environment to be
abusive). The conduct must be more severe than simple teasing or crude
comments. See Faragher,524 U.S. at 788 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)).
47. See id. at 787 n.1. Episodic harassment, unless extremely serious, is
insufficient to meet the "pervasive" requirement. See id.
48. See Harris,510 U.S. at 22.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 23.
51. See Faragher,524 U.S. at 786-88; Harris,510 U.S. at 23.
52. See Harris,510 U.S. at 23.
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avoid and/or eliminate harassment when it might occur; and (2)
the plaintiff employee failed to act with reasonable care to take
advantage of the employer's safeguards and otherwise to prevent
53
harm that could have been avoided.
When the employee is a victim of coworker harassment, the
employer will be liable only if its own negligence caused the hostile
work environment.5 4 The employer is negligent if it knew or
65
For
should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it.

the employer to be liable for a hostile work environment created by
coworker harassment, it must have known of the harassment and
acquiesced in such a manner as to condone and encourage the
coworkers' actions. 56
C. Adverse Employment Actions Under the Anti-Retaliation
Provision
The Supreme Court has never limited its application of
hostile work environment discrimination to section the standard
applicable under 703(a).5 7 However, the federal circuit courts
widely disagree about whether a hostile work environment caused
by retaliatory coworker harassment is even actionable under
section 704(a).S8
53. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher,524
U.S. at 775, 805-07.
54. See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 758-59 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b) (1957)).

55. See id.
56. See id. at 760 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1997)) (providing the "knows or
should have known" standard for liability in cases of harassment between "fellow
employees"); Faragher,524 U.S. at 788-89 (citing cases in which employers were
liable for harassment by co-workers because the employer knew of the harassment
but failed to act).
57. See discussion supra Part I.B.1-2 (describing the development of adverse
employment actions under the substantive anti-discrimination law provision,
section 703(a)(1), of Title VII).
58. Compare Fiedler v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973, 984-85 (91h Cir. 2000)
(recognizing that if the retaliation provision were interpreted in a strict manner,
"employers could retaliate at will so long as the retaliation does not rise to the level
of a constructive discharge" and that "Title VII's protection against retaliatory
discrimination extends to employer liability that rises to the level of an adverse
employment action"); Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426,
446 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[U]nchecked retaliatory coworker harassment, if sufficiently
severe, may constitute adverse employment action so as to satisfy the second prong
of the retaliation prima facie case."); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d
1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Under our circuit precedent we believe that coworker
hostility or retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently severe, may constitute 'adverse
employment action' for purposes of a retaliation claim."); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d
1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) ("No one would question the retaliatory effect of many
actions that put the complainant in a more unfriendly working environment ....
Nothing indicates why a different form of retaliation - namely, retaliating against
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1. Limiting Adverse Employment Actions to Ultimate
Employment Decisions
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits refuse to recognize any action
less than an ultimate employment decision as within the
prohibition of section 704(a). 59 These courts define an ultimate
employment decision as an act such as "hiring, granting leave,
discharging, promoting, and compensating." 60 Thus, the term can
be considered synonymous with a tangible employment action as
described in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth.6 1 By so limiting the
definition of adverse employment, the courts only recognize
retaliation in the form of a tangible employment action 62 and
completely disregard the hostile work environment doctrine
63
developed under section 703(a)(1).
64
A leading example is Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.
Mattern was a former employee who alleged that management
personnel and coworkers retaliated against her after she filed a
sexual harassment claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. 65 To support her claim of retaliation, Mattern
alleged several incidents of retaliatory harassment, including that
her coworkers uttered "accidents happen" as she passed by them,
that her locker was broken into, and that her work equipment was
stolen. 66 She also alleged that management failed to act after it
a complainant by permitting her fellow employees to punish her for invoking her
rights under Title VII - does not fall within the statute."); Wyatt v. City of Boston,
35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (providing examples of actions other than
discharge that fall within the scope of section 704(a) such as "employer actions such
as demotions, disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to promote,
unwarranted negative job evaluations and toleration of harassment by other
employees"), with Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997)
(requiring tangible changes in job duties resulting from an ultimate employment
decision); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)
(requiring employer action in the nature of an ultimate employment decision).
59. See Manning, 127 F.3d at 692; Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
60. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
61. See discussion supra Part I.B.1 (describing how a tangible employment
action may constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII).
62. See Manning, 127 F.3d at 692; Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
63. See supra note 62; see also Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144
(8th Cir. 1997) (finding no adverse employment action when employee suffered no
"material change in the terms and conditions of her employment").
64. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997).
65. See id. at 703-04.
66. See id. at 705. Other alleged actions were (1) receiving a home visit from a
supervisor to instruct her to report to a company doctor; (2) being reprimanded for
not being at her work station when she was in the Human Resources Department
protesting her abuse; (3) being threatened with firing by a supervisor; (4) receiving
a negative performance evaluation that caused her to miss a pay increase and be
placed on final warning; and (5) being required to climb scaffolding in a uniform
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learned of her coworker harassment. 67 The jury found in her
favor. 68 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning
that none of the 69actions she complained of were ultimate
employment actions.
Like other circuits, the court in Mattern looked to the antidiscrimination provision for guidance in its interpretation of the
anti-retaliation provision. 70 However, rather than interpreting
Title VII liberally, as is consistent with the purpose and
precedential interpretation of the Act, the court construed both
section 703(a)(1) and section 704(a) narrowly.
In doing so, the court first compared the text of sections
703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2), the two sub-provisions of the substantive
anti-discrimination section. 7 1 It then determined the reach of
section 703(a)(2) to be much greater than that of section
703(a)(1).7 2

Thus, the court concluded, section 703(a)(1) must

exclude the "vague harms" contemplated in section 703(a)(2) and
include only ultimate employment decisions.7 3 Since sections
703(a)(1) and 704(a) both make it unlawful for an employer "to
discriminate," the court reasoned that the anti-retaliation
and must only protect
provision must also exclude such harms
74
actions.
employment
ultimate
against
To define an ultimate employment action, the Mattern court
relied on the judicial interpretation formerly applied exclusively to
claims against the federal government under section 717 of Title
VII 7 and extended it to sections 703(a)(1) and 704(a).7 6 In
that was too large for her. See id. at 705-06.
67. See id. at 704.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 707-08. ("Hostility from fellow employees, having tools stolen, and
resulting anxiety, without more, do not constitute ultimate employment decisions,
and therefore are not the required adverse employment actions.")
70. See id. at 708-09.
71. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(a)(1) to (a)(2) (1999).
72. See Mattern, 104 F.3d at 709 (citing Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 782 (5th
Cir. 1985) (citing Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981))).
73. See Mattern, 104 F.3d at 709.
74. See id.
75. Title VII was amended in 1972 to include federal employees within its
scope, as stated in section 717. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1999) ("All personnel
actions affecting employees or applicants for employment [in federal government
positions] shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."). Some lower courts have construed the prohibition of
discrimination in "personnel actions" in section 717 to reach only discrimination in
ultimate employment decisions. See, e.g., Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233-34 (4th
Cir. 1981). In Page, an African-American postal worker alleged he had been denied
a promotion because of his race and brought suit against his employer under
section 717 of Title VII. See id. at 228-29. The Fourth Circuit rejected his claim.

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 19:101

adopting this interpretation and applying it to section 704(a), the
court expressly rejected coworker hostility as actionable under the
Although the Mattern court
anti-retaliation provision. 77
coworkers
might have an effect on
hostility
from
recognized that
the conditions of a person's employment, the court refused to
recognize that such behavior is enough to constitute an adverse
employment action because it does not rise to the level of an
ultimate employment decision. 78 The court reasoned that the
conduct of which Mattern complained was not an ultimate
employment decision, but merely tangential to future employment
79
decisions that could be considered ultimate.
The Mattern court also emphasized that its interpretation
supports the important policy of balancing the rights of the
employer and the employee. Concerned over how deeply into the
employment relationship Title VII should intrude, the court stated
that a more expansive construction of the adverse employment
action element would hinder the ability of the employer to manage
its employees.80 Moreover, the court was troubled that employers
may have difficulty separating conduct that is retaliatory from
conduct that is simply the result of negative interpersonal
It therefore held that the use of the ultimate
relations. 8 '
employment decision bright-line rule properly shields the
employer from fear that an employee may brandish his protected
In its analysis, the court analogized section 717 to section 703 of Title VII, stating,
"[t]he proper object of inquiry in a claim of disparate treatment has consistently
focused on the question whether there has been discrimination in what could be
characterized as ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave,
discharging, promoting, and compensating. This is the general level of decisions we
think contemplated by the term 'personnel action."' Id. at 233. The court further
noted that, while decisions other than those specified could fall within the meaning
of the term "personnel action," "it is obvious to us that there are many interlocutory
or mediate decisions having no immediate effect upon employment conditions
which were not intended to fall within the proscriptions of section 717 and
comparable provisions of Title VII." Id.; see also Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 78182 (5th Cir. 1985) (adopting the Page court limitation on "personnel action" under
section 717 to ultimate employment decisions in a retaliation claim).
76. See Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 707-08.
80. See id. at 708 ("To hold otherwise would be to expand the definition of
'adverse employment action' to include events such as disciplinary filings,
supervisor's reprimands, and even poor performance by the employee - anything
Such expansion is
which might jeopardize employment in the future.
unwarranted.").
81. See id.; see also Holland & Hart, Retaliation by Co-Workers can Lead to
Liability in DiscriminationCase, WYO. EMP. L. LETTER, Oct. 1998 (explaining that
employers need to be careful to separate actions based on personality conflicts from
those based on retaliation).
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and all adverse events that might affect him at
status against8any
2
the workplace.
The Eighth Circuit also narrowly construes the definition of
adverse employment action to include only ultimate employment
Specifically, in Manning v. Metropolitan Life
decisions.8 3
Insurance Co., 8 4 the

court

held

that

coworker

retaliatory

harassment in the form of "hostility and personal animus" and
"ostracization" is insufficiently severe to support a claim for
retaliation.8 5 The court further stated that "[a]bsent evidence of
some more tangible change in duties or working conditions that
constituted

a

material

employment

disadvantage ... [the

plaintiffs] did not present evidence sufficient to demonstrate any
adverse employment action that constitutes the sort of ultimate
employment decision intended to be actionable under Title VII."86
Thus, the Eighth Circuit also requires the retaliation to be in the
form of a tangible employment action and rejects the application of
the hostile work environment doctrine to the anti-retaliation
provision.
2. Courts that Broaden the Scope and Recognize that CoWorker Harassment May Be an Adverse Employment
Action
Other circuits adopt a more liberal construction of the
adverse employment action, finding decisions with substantially
less significant consequences to be sufficient.87 In fact, the First,
82. See Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707-08; see also Williams v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb
Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A transfer involving no reduction in pay and
no more than a minor change in working conditions will not do, either. Otherwise
every trivial personnel action that an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did
not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit.") (internal citations omitted).
83. See, e.g., Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 1997);
Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997); Harlston v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 1994).
84. 127 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 1997).

85. See id. at 692.
86. Id. (citing Ledergerber,122 F.3d at 1144).
87. See, e.g., Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir.
1998) ("We join the majority of circuits which have addressed the issue and hold
that Title VII's protection against retaliatory discrimination extends to adverse

actions which fall short of ultimate employment decisions."); Berry v. Stevinson
Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984-86 (10th Cir. 1996) (construing section 704(a) to reach
beyond ultimate employment decisions and protect an employee from a malicious
prosecution action brought by a former employer); Harrison v. Metro. Govt of
Nashville, 80 F.3d 1107, 1119 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that "an atmosphere in
which the plaintiffs activities were scrutinized more carefully than those of
comparably situated employees ... does support finding a retaliation"); Welsh v.
Derwinski, 14 F.3d 85, 86 (1st Cir. 1994) (rejecting the argument that an adverse
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Second, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held explicitly
that coworker retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently severe, can
constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of a Title
VII retaliation claim.88 These courts reason that, just as an
employer may be liable under section 703(a)(1) for coworker
harassment based on a protected characteristic, so too may an
employer be liable for harassment motivated by retaliation under
section 704(a) if it is severe or pervasive enough to materially alter
the work environment.8 9 Although section 704(a) does not itself
contain language requiring a materially adverse employment
action in order to state a claim, 90 the courts infer the requirement
from the basic prohibition of employment discrimination set forth
in section 703(a)(1). 9 1 Consistent with the Supreme Court's
analysis of a hostile work environment claim, 92 these courts take a
case-by-case approach to determine whether the retaliatory
harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a claim of
discrimination. 93
employment action only involved discharge, demotion or failure to promote; rather,
adverse employment action includes many things such as constant rudeness and
conspicuous discriminatory acts).
88. See, e.g., Fiedler v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973, 985 (91h Cir. 2000) ("Title VII's
protection against retaliatory discrimination extends to employer liability that rises
to the level of an adverse employment action"); Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of
Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999):
Just as an employer will be liable ... for a racially or sexually hostile work
environment created by a victim's co-workers if the employer knows about
(or reasonably should know about) that harassment but fails to take
appropriately remedial action, so too will an employer be held accountable
for allowing retaliatory co-worker harassment to occur if it knows about
that harassment but fails to act to stop it.
Id. at 446; see also Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th
Cir. 1998) ("[C]o-worker hostility or retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently severe,
may constitute 'adverse employment action' for purposes of a retaliation claim.");
Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[T]here is nothing to indicate
that the principle of employer responsibility [involved in direct claims of
harassment by coworkers] does not extend equally to other Title VII claims, such as
a claim of unlawful retaliation."); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st
Cir. 1994) (stating that "employer actions such as demotions, disadvantageous
transfers or assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted negative job
evaluations and toleration of harassment by other employees" would constitute
adverse employment action under Title VII). The Sixth Circuit has explicitly
reserved to rule on whether an employer can be liable for coworkers' retaliatory
harassment. See Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784, 791 n.8 (6th
Cir. 2000).
89. See Richardson, 180 F.3d at 446.
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1999).
91. See Richardson, 180 F.3d at 446; Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1264; Knox, 93 F.3d
at 1334; Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15-16.
92. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (listing factors considered
to analyze a hostile environment claim).
93. See, e.g., Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir.
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One example of a case where coworker retaliatory
harassment was found to be sufficiently severe is Knox v.
Indiana.94 Knox was a correctional officer at a state correctional
facility. During her employment, she was subjected to "blatant
sexual harassment on the job" by her supervisor and reported the
action to the facility's affirmative action officer. 95 After being
informed that Knox had filed harassment charges against him, her
supervisor told his friends who also worked at the correctional
facility. 96 Thereafter, these fellow employees began to make
insulting and demeaning statements about Knox, both to staff and
in front of inmates. 97 In addition, they openly remarked that "they
intended to make Knox's life 'hell,' and that they were going to 'get
her."'98

Knox reported the relentless campaign of coworker

However, the
retaliatory harassment to her supervisor. 99
affirmative action officer failed to make a reasonable effort to stop
the retaliatory harassment. 10 0
In finding the employer liable for retaliatory harassment by
its employees, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that it
is well established that an employer can be held liable under Title
VII for sexual harassment by coworkers if the employer had actual
or constructive knowledge of the harassment and failed to address
the problem adequately. 10 1 The court further found that "there is
nothing to indicate that the principle of employer responsibility
[involved in direct claims of harassment by coworkers] does not
extend equally to other Title VII claims, such as a claim of
10 2
unlawful retaliation."

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the same hostile
work environment analysis to a retaliation claim in Gunnell v.
Utah Valley State College.10 3 Gunnell was a former employee who
brought an action against her employer for sexual harassment and
1998) ("Co-worker hostility or retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently severe, may
constitute an 'adverse employment action' for purposes of a retaliation claim.");
Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d at 15-16 (stating that employer actions such as
toleration of harassment by other employees may constitute an adverse
employment action under Title VII).
94. 93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996).
95. See id. at 1329.
96. See id. at 1331.

97. See id.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1333-35.
Id. at 1334.
152 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
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retaliation. 104
While still employed, she complained to the
employer's personnel director that her supervisor had subjected
her to verbal and physical sexual harassment, including gestures,
comments and unwelcome physical contact. 105 In response to the
complaint, Gunnell alleged that her coworkers shunned her, made
false statements about her, and excluded her from office
communications. 0 6 She never reported the retaliatory conduct.107
The court noted that the remedial nature of Title VII dictated a
liberal definition of adverse employment action, 108 and determined
that "coworker hostility or retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently
severe, may constitute 'adverse employment action' for the
purposes of a retaliation claim." 109 Nevertheless, since none of the
supervisory or management-level personnel knew of the
coworkers' retaliation, the employer was not liable." 0
Munday v. Waste Management of North America, Inc.,"'
provides an example of conduct that is insufficiently severe or
pervasive to constitute an adverse employment action under the
anti-retaliation provision. After Munday filed a discrimination
suit against her employer, the general manager of the facility
where she worked instructed employees to ignore her and report to
him anything she said to other employees." 2 He targeted only
Munday, but did not generally forbid other employees from
speaking or associating with others." 3 He also yelled at her
because he had heard a rumor that she planned to sue the
company again. 114 Munday denied this and attempted to address
her concerns, but the manager stated, colorfully, that he did not
care about her problems. 115 Although recognizing that coworker
harassment may adversely affect the work environment," 6 the
104. Id. at 1257.
105. See id.
106. See id. Gunnell also alleged that she was given inferior office equipment,
assigned menial office tasks and that her job was restructured to minimize duties
and complexity. See id.
107. See id. at 1257-59.
108. See id. at 1264 (citing Jeffries v. Kansan, 147 F.3d 1220, 1231-32 (10th Cir.
1998)).
109. Id. at 1264.
110. See id. at 1265.
111. 126 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 1997).
112. See id. at 241.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 244 (noting that intolerable working conditions may constitute a
constructive discharge and therefore rise to the level of an adverse employment
action).
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to recognize the
ostracizing and spying as sufficiently severe to support a claim for
retaliation. 117
The common denominator in the analyses of these courts is
that the harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to
constitute a hostile work environment and that the employer must
be negligent in failing to stop the retaliation.1 18 This follows what
the Supreme Court has dictated as the proper analysis under Title
VII.119
3. The EEOC's Interpretation
Commission
Opportunity
Employment
Equal
The
acknowledges the split among the courts regarding the scope of the
adverse employment action requirement, 120 but concludes that
section 704(a) should be construed broadly. 12 1 Moreover, among
the actions identified as forbidden retaliation, the EEOC
Compliance Manual specifically recognizes coworker harassment
or intimidation as a violation of section 704(a). 122 Consistent with
the Supreme Court's interpretation of a hostile work environment
claim, 123 the EEOC requires that the retaliation subjectively and
objectively create severe or pervasive hostility in the employee's
117. See id. at 243 ("In no case in this circuit have we found an adverse
employment action to encompass a situation where the employer has instructed
employees to ignore and spy on an employee who engaged in protected activity,
without evidence that the terms, conditions, or benefits of her employment were
adversely effected.").
118. See Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (7th Cir. 1996); Gunnell v. Utah
Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) ("An employer may not be
held liable for the retaliatory acts of co-workers if none of its supervisory or
management-level personnel orchestrated, condoned, or encouraged the co-workers'
actions, and no such management participation could occur if the supervisory or
management-level personnel did not actually know of the co-workers' retaliation.").
119. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (describing the hostile work environment
doctrine in employment discrimination cases).
120. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ("EEOC") COMPLIANCE
MANUAL § 614.7 (1992); see also Williams & Rhodes, supra note 24, at 62 (quoting
the EEOC Directive 915.003 at 8-13) ("[s]ome courts have held that the retaliation
provisions apply only to retaliation that takes the form of ultimate employment
actions... [o]thers have construed the provisions more broadly, but have required
that the action materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.") (citations omitted).
121. See EEOC, supra note 120, § 614.7 (1992); see also Williams & Rhodes,
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
122. See EEOC, supra note 120, § 614.7 (1992) ("If others, such as coworkers...
retaliate against [an employee] for having opposed employment discrimination, the
[employer] will, under certain circumstances, have a duty to take steps reasonably
calculated to end the retaliation.").
123. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (describing the hostile work environment
doctrine in employment discrimination cases).
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working environment. 124 In addition, the Manual indicates that
an employer is liable under section 704(a) for failing to take
reasonable steps to remedy or prevent coworker retaliation. 125
1I. Broadening the Scope of Section 704(a) to Proscribe
Retaliatory Co-Worker Harassment
An extension of section 704(a) to recognize retaliatory
harassment by coworkers as within the scope of the provision is
consistent with the text, liberal interpretation, and broad purpose
of the provision.
A. Recognizing Co-Worker RetaliatoryHarassmentas an
Adverse Employment Action is Consistent with the
Language of Title VII, Section 704(a)
Section 704(a), the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII,
makes it unlawful for:
an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or
applicants for employment.., because he [the employee or
applicant] has opposed any practice[,] made an unlawful
employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an
126
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VIII.
The anti-retaliation provision is, on its face, broader than the
substantive
anti-discrimination
provision. 127
The
antidiscrimination provision contains detailed and specific text, with
numerous and precise verbs and explicit restrictions with respect
to the terms, conditions or privileges of employment and
employment opportunities. 128
In contrast, the anti-retaliation
provision does not. 129 It simply and broadly prohibits an employer
124. See EEOC, supra note 120, § 614.7 (1992) (recognizing that retaliation
against people who protest unlawful employment discrimination can take many
forms).
125. See EEOC, supra note 120, § 614.7 (1992).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1999).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) to (a)(2) (1999); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1999).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-2(a)(1) to (a)(2) (1999).
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1999); see also Knox v. State of Indiana, 93 F.3d
1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) ("There is nothing in the law of retaliation that restricts
the type of retaliatory act that might be visited upon an employee who seeks to
invoke her rights by filing a complaint. It need only be an adverse employment
action, ... adverse [employment] actions can take many shapes and sizes ....
The
law deliberately does not take a laundry list approach to retaliation because
unfortunately its forms are as varied as the human imagination will permit.");
Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("The statute itself
proscribes 'discriminat[ion]' against those who invoke the Act's protections; the
statute does not limit its reach only to acts of retaliation that take the form of
cognizable employment actions such as discharge, transfer, or demotion.").
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from discriminating against an employee because he vindicated
himself and fought for his Title VII rights. 130 Thus, the antiretaliation provision, which does not limit the scope of unlawful
employment action to specific actions or conditions, should be
construed more broadly than the substantive anti-discrimination
provision.
B. Recognizing Coworker Retaliatory Harassmentas an
Adverse Employment Action Is Consistent with the Liberal
Interpretationand Broad Purposeof Title VII and Section
704(a)
The purpose of section 704(a) is to prevent employers from
chilling employees' assertion of Title VII rights. 131 To achieve the
specific purpose of the provision and the overall purposes of Title
VII, 132 section 704(a) affords broad protection against retaliation

33
for those who seek protection of employment-related civil rights.1
Recognizing that claims may not come within the scope of the
retaliation provision if interpreted literally, courts are extending
purpose of Title VII and
the scope to comport with both the overall
34
the specific purpose of section 704(a).1
For example, although the text of neither provision provides
the distinction, the courts interpret section 704(a) to allow a
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1999).
131. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 2653 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1999)); see also EEOC, supra note
120, § 614.7 (1992).
132. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 2653
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1999)).
133. See, e.g., Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir.
1998) ("Permitting employers to discriminate against an employee who files a
charge of discrimination so long as the retaliatory discrimination does not
constitute an ultimate employment action could stifle employees' willingness to file
charges of discrimination."); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006
n. 18 (5th Cir. 1969) ("The protection of assistance and participation in any manner
would be illusory if [an] employer could retaliate against [an] employee for having
assisted or participated in a [Title VII] proceeding."); see also EEOC, supra note
120, § 614.7 (1992).
134. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996)
(identifying situations, "apparently not foreseen by Congress, in which a literal
interpretation of the provision would leave a gaping hole in the protection of
complainants and witnesses"). The court, in dicta, stated that it would extend the
protection of the anti-retaliation provision to situations where (1) an employer
retaliates against an employee for failing to prevent the filing of a Title VII
complaint by a coworker; and (2) the employer either does not know who the
complainant is and decides therefore to retaliate against a group of workers that he
knows includes the complainant, or makes a mistake and retaliates against the
wrong person. See id. "Both are cases of genuine retaliation, and we cannot think
of any reason.., other than pure oversight, why Congress should have excluded
them from the protection of [section 704(a)]." Id.
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retaliation claim even when no actual discrimination has occurred
or if a discrimination claim under section 703(a) fails. 135 An
employee need not prove a discrimination claim to sustain a
retaliation claim. Rather, he or she must only reasonably believe
136
that an unlawful employment practice has occurred.
Recognition of retaliation claims under section 704(a) in situations
where a discrimination claim under section 703(a) is not viable
further implies that a retaliation claim has a broader objective
than a discrimination claim.137
The Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.138
further supports the broad interpretation of section 704(a).
Although the text of the provision only prohibits discrimination
against "employees or applicants for employment,"'1 39 the Court
held that section 704(a) also extends to former employees as long
as the alleged discrimination is related to, or arises out of, the
employment relationship. 1 40
The retaliation provision thus
protects a former employee from post-employment actions
allegedly taken in retaliation for the employee's protected
activity.14 1

Further evidence of the courts' willingness to extend

the application of the anti-retaliation provision is that courts have
extended the scope of section 704(a) of Title VII to encompass suits
brought to remedy retaliatory action resulting from the
prosecution of a claim under the Equal Pay Act 142 and other antidiscrimination statutes. 143 Therefore, the further broadening of
135. See, e.g., Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1549 (11th Cir. 1989); Rucker v.
Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1982); Payne v. McLemore's
Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1137 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that a
plaintiff can satisfy the first prong of the prima facie case by showing a reasonable
belief that an unlawful employment practice occurred, and that the action was
attributable to the employer).
136. See Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 702 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that it is not
necessary that the employer is actually committing an unlawful employment
practice under Title VII; rather, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to reasonably believe
that the employer is violating the statute).
137. See White, supra note 12, at 1165-66 and accompanying text.
138. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1999).
140. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346; see also Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d
322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that a cancellation of a major symposium in
former employee's honor after the employer learned that the employee filed charges
of age discrimination could be an adverse employment action under the antiretaliation provision).
141. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346 (recognizing that a former employee is
protected under section 704(a) thereby allowing him or her to bring a claim against
a former employer for giving negative job references to other potential employers in
retaliation for the employee filing a Title VII claim).
142. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
143. See Passer,935 F.2d at 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Wu v. Thomas, 863
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section 704(a) to include coworker retaliatory harassment is
consistent with the liberal interpretation of the provision.
C. Limiting Adverse Employment Actions to Ultimate
Employment Decisions Is Inconsistent with the Language,
Interpretationand Purpose of Title VII and Section 704(a)
Confining an adverse employment action to an ultimate
employment decision conflicts with the clear statutory language,
purpose and judicial interpretation of section 704(a) of Title VII.
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits' interpretation of section 704(a),
limiting an adverse employment action to an ultimate employment
decision, is inconsistent with the plain language of the
The ordinary understanding of the verb
provision. 44
"discriminate" is not limited to the actions defined as ultimate
employment decisions.1 45 Rather, the plain meaning is defined
broadly to encompass all manners of differentiation and
discernment.146

The narrow definition of the adverse employment action,
which necessarily links it to ultimate employment decisions, also
squarely conflicts with the broad purpose of Title VII. Courts that
limit the definition of adverse employment actions to ultimate
employment decisions rely on the notion that Title VII was
147
designed to address only ultimate employment decisions.
However, the Supreme Court has expressly declined to limit Title
VII's prohibition against discrimination to employment actions
with tangible economic effects. 148 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has held that Title VII is violated when an employer
discriminates on the basis of a protected characteristic by creating
F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (11th Cir. 1989) (recognizing claim of retaliation based on a suit
alleging gender discrimination under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
144. See Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998)
(directly criticizing the Mattern court's limitation of adverse employment action to
ultimate employment decisions).
145. See id.; see also Passer, 935 F.2d at 331 ("The statute itself proscribes
'discriminat[ion]' against those who invoke the Act's protections; the statute does
not limit its reach only to acts of retaliation that take the form of cognizable
employment actions such as discharge, transfer or demotion.").
146. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 423 (David B. Guralink et al. eds.,
2d ed. 1986).
147. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (1997) (relying on
Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995)) ('Title VII was designed to
address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by
employers that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate
decisions.").
148. See discussion supra Part I.B (describing the liberal interpretation of Title
VII's anti-discrimination provision).
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a hostile or abusive work environment, which can be determined
only

by

"looking

at

all

the

circumstances[.]'

149

Such

interpretations clearly indicate that Title VII extends protection
against employment actions beyond ultimate employment
decisions.
Furthermore, the courts that adopt the ultimate employment
decision standard essentially adopt mutually contradictory
positions in treating retaliation claims. The confinement of the
adverse employment action to only ultimate employment actions
renders a retaliation claim far more limited than an underlying
discrimination claim. 150 Paradoxically, all courts, including the
ultimate employment decision courts, recognize that a retaliation
claim may exist even when no actual discrimination has
occurred, 15 1 implying that a retaliation claim has a broader
objective than a discrimination claim.
Finally, the Mattern court's reliance on section 717 of Title
152
VII to define the adverse employment action is misplaced.
Although both provisions were enacted to effectuate the general
goals of Title VII, the provisions are substantially distinct in
several ways. 153 First, section 717 specifically requires that there
be a personnel action, thereby narrowing significantly the scope of
the provision. 54 A personnel action is not merely discrimination,
but need not necessarily rise to the level of an ultimate
employment action. 155 The language of section 704(a) is broader
149. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998).
150. See discussion supra Part I.C.1 (describing the restriction of adverse
employment actions to ultimate employment decisions).
151. See, e.g., Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1549 (1lth Cir. 1989) (noting that a
retaliation claim does not require that the employer actually have been engaged in
an unlawful employment practice; instead, the plaintiff need only have a
"reasonable belief' that an unlawful employment practice was occurring); Payne v.
McLeoner's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1137-40 (5th Cir. 1981)
(requiring only a reasonable belief that the employer engaged in an unlawful
employment practice to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge).
152. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 717 (5th Cir. 1997)
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (stating that Page v. Bolger, the decision on which the
majority opinion relied, did not restrict recovery under section 717 to situations
where an employee was discriminated against by the employer in an "ultimate
employment decision" such as "hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and
compensation").
153. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1999), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1999).
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1999).
155. While the Page court explicitly qualified its definition of a personnel action,
it nonetheless stated that its list of described actions was not exhaustive. See Page
v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981) ("[W]e suggest no general test for
defining those 'ultimate employment decisions' which alone should be held directly
covered by [section 717] and comparable anti-discrimination provisions under Title
VII. Among the myriad of decisions constantly being taken at all levels and with
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regarding its prohibition on employer conduct in that it prohibits
156
any discrimination, as opposed to merely personnel actions.
Second, section 717 exclusively addresses discrimination in federal
employment. 157 Its purpose is to extend the protection of Title VII
to employees of the federal government. 158 By doing so, Congress
did not intend to restrict the protection of employees in the private
sector, accorded by sections 703(a) and 704(a). 159 If Congress
intended to restrict the protection under sections 703(a) and 704(a)
to that of section 717, it would have amended the language to
reflect this narrow application. 160 Thus, by erroneously relying on
section 717 to interpret sections 703(a) and 704(a), the Mattern
court squarely contradicted both the text and purpose of the
provisions and impeded the protection of the civil rights of
employees.
III. Courts Should Uniformly Recognize that Coworker
Retaliatory Harassment May Violate Section 704(a)
A. CourtsShould Extend the Hostile Work Environment
DiscriminationDoctrineDeveloped Under Section 703(a) to
Section 704(a)
To ensure the achievement of the purposes of Title VII, courts
frequently turn to section 703(a), the substantive antidiscrimination provision, for guidance in interpretation of section
704(a), the anti-retaliation provision. 16 1 Under section 703(a)(1),
an employer may be liable for discriminatory harassment when
the conduct (1) is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the
conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive work
environment; and (2) the employer knew or should have known of

all degrees of significance in the general employment contexts covered by Title VII

there are certainly others than those we have so far specifically identified that may
").
be so considered ....
156. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 200e-3(a) (1999), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1999).
157. See Page, 645 F.2d at 233; see also Mattern, 104 F.3d. at 717-18 n.1 (Dennis,
J., dissenting) (noting that there is no indication that the Page court intended the
'personnel actions' definition to apply to the retaliation provision in §2000e-3(a)).
158. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-17 (1999)).
159. See id.
160. Congress did not change the text of sections 703(a) and 704(a) when it
amended Title VII to add section 717. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-17
(1999)).
161. See discussion supra Part L.A (discussing judicial interpretation of antidiscrimination and anti-retaliation provisions).
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the harassment but failed to take reasonably calculated steps to
end the abuse. 162 Consistent with this approach, and noting that
163
the scope of section 704(a) is broader than that of section 703(a),
courts should extend the hostile work environment doctrine of
discrimination recognized under section 703(a) to section 704(a).
By recognizing that retaliatory coworker harassment is within the
scope of section 704(a), courts comply with the text and liberal
interpretation of the provision and carry out the purposes of both
the anti-retaliation provision and Title VII. 164
There is no rationale supporting an interpretation of Title VII
that affords less protection against retaliatory discrimination than
against discrimination protected under the substantive antidiscrimination provision. The individual and collective effects of
discrimination are similar, independent of whether they are
motivated by discrimination against a protected characteristic or
protected activity.
Furthermore, the policy reasons given by courts that limit an
adverse employment action to ultimate employment decisions are
unwarranted. For example, the Mattern court warned that a
broadening of the definition would unjustifiably expose an
employer to liability in such a way that it would interfere with the
employer's managerial and enforcement powers. 165
Two
arguments repudiate this apprehension. First, noting the lack of
legislative history that supports a restriction of section 704(a) to a
narrower interpretation than section 703(a), the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Knox v. Indianastated:
There is nothing in the law of retaliation that restricts the
type of retaliatory act that might be visited upon an employee
who seeks to invoke her rights by filing a complaint. It need
only be an adverse employment action... adverse actions can
take many shapes and sizes .... The law deliberately does
not take a 'laundry list' approach to retaliation, because
unfortunately its forms are as varied as the human
imagination will permit. 166
Thus, the provision itself justifies the liberal interpretation and
extension of it to proscribe coworker retaliatory harassment.

162. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (describing employer liability for hostile
work environment).
163. See discussion supra Part II.B (comparing scope of sections 703(a) and
704(a)).
164. See discussion supra Part II.A-B (arguing that an extension of 704(a) to
recognize coworker retaliation as discrimination is consistent with the text, intent,
and purpose of the provision).
165. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997).
166. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1335 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Second, the courts that have extended the definition of
adverse employment action to employer actions beyond ultimate
employment decisions have created safeguards to protect against
the slippery slope effect. All courts recognize that not all adverse
behavior constitutes an adverse employment action 16 7 and realize
that reserving employment discrimination statutes for workplace
decisions of material consequence conserves judicial resources and
avoids trivializing discrimination complaints. 168 As the Supreme
Court explained in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 169 "[t]hese
standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to
170
ensure that Title VII does not become a general civility code."'
Restricting actionable harassment to severe or pervasive
situations will filter out complaints attacking "the ordinary
tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive
language, gender-related jokes and occasional teasing."17'
Therefore, the judicially created limitations imposed on hostile
work environment claims under section 703(a) maintain the
balance of rights between employer and employee. Similarly, by
limiting the scope of section 704(a) to retaliatory discrimination
that is so severe or pervasive as to materially alter the terms or
conditions of employment, courts have balanced carefully the
rights of the employer with those of the employee.

167. See, e.g., Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 885 (7th Cir.
1998) (noting that Title VII is not directed at "unpleasantness per se" but only
against discrimination in the conditions of employment); Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d
550 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that reprimands in the form of counseling statements
do not constitute adverse employment action); Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127
F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Although actions short of termination may
constitute an adverse employment action within the meaning of the statute, 'not
everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse employment
action."') (quoting Montandon v. Farmland Indus., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir.
1997)); Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466 (2d Cir. 1997)

("[N]ot every unpleasant matter short of [discharge or demotion] creates cause of
action' [for retaliation].").
168. See, e.g., Williams v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.
1996) (noting that courts are expressing fear that trivial personnel actions that a
disgruntled employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit); see
also White, supra note 12, at 1128 n.30 (noting that the Seventh Circuit, in
defending the need for a materially adverse employment action stated that "[tihe
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, already staggering under an
avalanche of filings too heavy for it to cope with, would be crushed, and serious
complaints would be lost among the trivial.") (quoting Williams, 85 F.3d at 274).
169. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
170. Id. at 787-88 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75,
81(1998)).
171. Id. at 775 (quoting BARBARA LINDERMAN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 175 (1992)).
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B. Courts Need Uniform Interpretation
The lack of consensus among jurisdictions as to what
constitutes adverse employment action has spurred demands for
uniform interpretation to clarify the scope of the provision. 72 This
could be done either through Supreme Court interpretation or
statutory amendment of section 704(a). The wide variation in
interpretation has led to an increase in litigation and
unpredictable results. 173 Consistent interpretation is needed so
both employees and employers know which actions are protected
under the statute, thereby leading to a reduction in litigation and
a closer adherence to the purposes of Title VII.174

Until a uniform interpretation of an adverse employment
action under section 704(a) is recognized, employers may take
proactive steps to protect themselves against retaliation claims.175
First, employers must inform supervisors about which activities
are protected, in order to avoid inadvertent violations of Title
VII.176 Second, employers must provide well-drafted and widely
77
published anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation policies.
Complaints of discrimination or harassment must be treated
confidentially to reduce the chance that a complaining employee
will be subject to reprisal by coworkers.' 78 In addition, if an
employee complains to management about discrimination, the
employee must be told to immediately report any acts of
retaliation. Honest, regular evaluations also play an important
role, as it is much easier for an employer to defend a retaliation
claim against a former employee who has a long and welldocumented history of performance problems than against an
employee who was terminated for no established reason shortly
172. See Eric J. Wallach & Mark E. Greenfield, The EEOC Has Delineated the
Risk of Liability for Retaliation when an Employer Takes Action Against a Worker
who Complains of Discrimination or Harassment, 20 NAT'L L.J. 47, 47 (1998)
(noting that retaliation complaints received each year by the EEOC more than
doubled in number between 1991 and 1997, from 7900 to 18,100); see also White,
supra note 12, at 1124 n.14 (noting a 300% increase in all employment cases filed
in federal district courts for the same time period).

173. See Wallach & Greenfield, supra note 172; see also supra note 12 and
accompanying text (noting broad interpretation of various anti-discrimination
provisions).
174. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (stating that unwary employers,
confident that they have engaged in no unlawful discrimination, are unwittingly
subjecting themselves to liability by retaliating, either intentionally or
inadvertently, against an employee or former employee who believes otherwise).
175. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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9 In taking such
after complaining of discriminatory conduct. 7
precautions, employers will fulfill the purpose of section 704(a) by
minimizing retaliatory harassment.

Conclusion
To better achieve the purposes of the provision and balance
the rights of employers and employees, courts should uniformly
recognize that an employer violates section 704(a) when (1) the
abusive conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter
the conditions of employment; and (2) the employer knew of the
discrimination; but (3) failed to take reasonable remedial steps.
The Supreme Court has recognized that discriminatory
harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile
work environment violates the substantive anti-discrimination
provisions of Title VII.180 Since the scope of section 704(a) is
broader than that of section 703(a), it necessarily follows that an
employer not only violates section 703(a) when it condones severe
or pervasive harassment, but also violates section 704(a) when it
discriminates against an employee for participating in the
enforcement of Title VII by creating a hostile or abusive work
environment.
Moreover, there is no justification for interpreting Title VII to
afford less protection against retaliatory discrimination than
against discrimination based on a protected characteristic. The
negative and degrading psychological effects on the victim are the
same, and exist independently of whether the discriminatory
motive is based on a protected characteristic or a protected
activity. Both forms of harassment, if sufficiently severe, may
alter the terms and conditions of employment for the victim.
Thus, since an employer may be liable under section 703(a) for a
hostile work environment resulting from discrimination, it should
also be liable under section 704(a) for hostile work environment
caused by coworker retaliatory harassment. Interpreting Title VII
to prohibit coworker retaliatory harassment is the most effective
means to both balance the rights of employers and employees and
purposively enact the broader anti-discrimination objectives of
Title VII.

179. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
180. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (describing the hostile work environment
doctrine in employment discrimination cases).

